
Few areas of study are more complex than that of the human act, taking into account all its constitutive factors, both interior and exterior, from causation to moral value. Medieval Scholastic thought contributed much to the development of this topic in a climate of heightened emphasis on Moral Theology, with St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham standing out for the decisive influence of their doctrines. But despite their shared Aristotelian orientation, the theories of these Schoolmen only rarely overlap, offering more divergence than consensus on any given aspect of the human act. Thomas M. Osborne Jr., a specialist in Medieval and late Scholastic philosophy, accomplishes something of a feat, then, in bringing together the main lines of thought of these three figures on so vast a theme in under 250 pages of text, in his Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus & William of Ockham. The work was published in 2014 by the Catholic University of America, and has been awarded the Charles Cardinal Journet Prize.

The author breaks up the human act thematically, taking his cues from the relevant questions in Part I-II of the Summa Theologiae (q. 6-21). Each topic then proceeds in a threefold exposition with the Dominican Aquinas opening the discussion, followed in chronological order by the Franciscans Scotus and Ockham — the latter a student, albeit an often dissident one, of the former. In analysing their respective positions, Osborne carefully demonstrates the disparities in their views, but is able, nonetheless, to identify a common thread that runs among them, distinguishing medieval from modern thought.

The first three chapters of this book could be said to provide a synthesis of Scholastic Moral Psychology. They concentrate on the subject of human action.
in his willing and reasoning capacity, given that, in order for an act to be free and fully human, it must be caused by these two powers — which are distinct both from each other and from the soul in the Dominican view, while, in the Franciscan tradition, no such real distinctions exist. Further dimensions complete the picture by comparing the human powers with the angelic and the divine. Part of the third and the last two of the book’s five chapters shift the focus to the objective analysis of the act itself.

In Chapter One, entitled “Causes of the Act”, each of the three Scholastics give a varied account of how reason, will, and object influence the agent in his choice of action in the roles of formal, efficient, and final causes, and deals with the question of freedom — that is, the efficient causality of an act resting in the subject rather than the object — both during the present life and in the beatific vision, given factors outside of the agent’s control, such as nature and necessity. Here, considering the way in which St. Thomas ascribes efficient causality to the will alone, Osborne points out the inadequacy of qualifying him as an “intellectualist” in a general way, and likewise Scotus and Ockham as “voluntarists”, as both involve the intellect, to varying degrees, as efficient cause.

The second chapter, “Practical Reason”, explores the distinction between speculative and practical reasoning, both of which are guided by a first principle — that of non-contradiction, for speculative reason, and the moral principle “do good and avoid evil” for practical reason. Accordingly, the former is strictly concerned with distinguishing things intellectually, while the latter is ordered to a particular action. The author discusses the different explanations as to how the deliberation leading to a given act involves volition. There are also varied views on how moral science, prudence and conscience direct the cognitive and appetitive powers towards the act’s end, and their part in the moral rectitude of action. These differences are related to the fact that, while the Aquinate consistently refers to a moral order based on the unchanging goodness of the divine nature, Scotus and Ockham offer an account of a moral order owing solely to the command of God’s will.

Chapter Three begins by providing background information on the terms used to designate the three main components of the human act in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely: will, deliberation, and choice. Particularly, the meanings attributed to Aristotle’s will (*boulesis*) are examined, and the suitability of its Latin rendering as *voluntas* by Medieval translators is questioned. In what follows, Osborne goes on to observe the complexity of the work of the Angelic Doctor, describing how he divides the human act into several distinct parts, some of which are acts of the will in relation to the end and others to the means, while still others are corresponding acts of the
intellect, resulting in a total of twelve stages. Ockham and Scotus propose simpler processes, while essentially following the Aristotelian structure of the act. This chapter sheds further light on the practical syllogism as it relates to deliberation, and on freedom, as it relates to choice.

Chapter Four deals with the evaluation and specification of the act. The determination of an act’s moral goodness or malice requires the consideration of its object, end, and circumstances, which are seven, as carried forward from the rhetorical tradition of antiquity. The Angelic Doctor, in particular, brings both omission and commission into the evaluation. Also, both interior and exterior acts are subject to moral scrutiny, and these were distinguished, until Ockham’s time, from the natural species of the act, since two very different moral acts, one good and the other evil, can share the same natural species. In a similar distinction, St. Thomas shows how different acts may have the same material object, such as money, but under diverse forms, such as liberality or avarice, so that the formal aspect is what determines the moral value of the act. For him, the end, both proximate and remote, takes precedence as the formal and specifying factor. Scotus also sees the end as the ultimate determiner of the act’s species but he also places importance on the judgement of an act’s object for its generic qualification, and additionally conditions the moral goodness of an act on the concurrence of good circumstances. All three deal with the topic of virtue, and for Ockham, particularly, the idea of right reason is essential to the description of a virtuous act.

The fifth and last chapter expounds on “Indifferent, Good, and Meritorious acts”. This is the only chapter in the book to break away from the pattern of treating of each figure in a separate section. Roughly the same order is followed, but in a more spontaneous fashion, which allows for an arguably more readable development of the topics. These include the various understandings of interior and exterior acts and their respective moral character, whether some human acts can be classified as morally indifferent, such as in the absence of a deliberately defined end, and to what extent grace, charity, and moral goodness are necessary conditions for supernatural merit. In the Thomistic account, charity accompanies sanctifying grace, and any morally good act performed in this state is meritorious. The two Franciscans have a different visualization of how an act can avail merit, the essential factor being God’s acceptance of it, which does not absolutely depend on any other stipulation. There is ample demonstration of how Ockham’s theories, even more than those of Scotus, are marked by the tendency already brought to light in Chapter Two, of speculating on possible moral orders which God could have established but did not. By His absolute pow-
er, Ockham maintains, God could have ordained that what is now mortally sinful would be meritorious and vice versa. In other words, he holds that evil actions are so only because they are forbidden by God, and not because they are evil per se, as they are for St. Thomas. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile this discrepancy with the author’s claim in the introduction that “Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham all think that some actions are intrinsically wrong, and they generally agree on which actions are so” (p. xvii).

The amount of information this book brings together into such limited space represents both a benefit and a drawback to readers. On one side, there is the convenience of a comprehensive guide to the essential action theory of these three important Scholastics, which is hard to find in one book. Moreover, its systematic structure makes it easy to locate specific topics quickly. On the reverse side, such a brief overview precludes the possibility of offering exhaustive analyses.

But perhaps the space slated for this work would have been better used by adapting the amount allotted for each thinker to his particular contribution to the theme. Despite the fact that Osborne acknowledges the superiority of St. Thomas’ output over that of Scotus and Ockham, not only in terms of its volume and cohesion, but also for the greater scope of its influence, historically, he has met the self-imposed requirement of giving approximately equal treatment to each of them. This may have been in compliance with the perceived demands of scholarly neutrality, but as result, other inequalities ensue: coverage of the Thomistic doctrine, drawn from copious sources, is noticeably condensed, while that of the two Franciscans is more commodious by comparison. This is especially true of Ockham, whose output is by far the least extensive among the three, and whose method and ideas the least developed in the area of human action. A less constrained approach may have allowed for a more natural and realistic distribution of material.

A point that is bound to be conspicuous to non-American readers is the way in which author Dr. Thomas Osborne, Philosophy professor at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, sometimes illustrates a point with examples taken from American culture in a way that can seem incongruent in a discussion unfolding among Medieval Scholastics. Also, he tends to rely heavily on his compatriots as secondary sources, which may give the overall impression that, while the author does actively involve the ideas of other specialists in his field, the exchange is made within a chiefly intra-national context, aimed at a primarily domestic readership.

Such an inference, in reality, would do an injustice to this work, which has much to offer to a more global public of philosophical and theological interest. It lends itself particularly well to areas
of specialization such as High Scholasticism and Medieval Aristotelianism, from both historical and theoretical perspectives, Moral Theology, Ethics, and Philosophical Psychology. Also, considering that Thomism enjoys far more influence today than do other schools that arose within Scholasticism, Thomist scholars may stand to benefit by gaining a broader awareness of the similarities and differences between Thomism, Scotism and Ockhamism, so as to appreciate the impact each had in the high and late medieval views on human action, particularly as pertains to morality.

Kyla MacDonald, EP
(Prof. - IFTE)


O professor e escritor Carlos Nougué logrou realizar um grande feito: trazer a lume uma gramática portuguesa involucrada pela teoria e importância da própria Gramática, com nítido viés filosófico. A própria escolha do título faz ressonar um dos estilos literários típicos da Escolástica, isto é, as famosas “sumas” — compêndios sistemáticos sobre uma matéria específica —, cujo ápice é atingido pela monumental *Suma Teológica* de São Tomás de Aquino. É notório que tais características distinguem esta gramática das atualmente disponíveis no mercado.

O currículo do Autor atesta sua capacitação na área: durante nove anos ocupou a cadeira de Língua Portuguesa e a de Tradução Literária numa pós-graduação (UGF), ganhou o Prêmio Jabuti/93 de tradução, tendo sido indicado outras vezes, uma delas pela tradução de D. Quixote. Ademais de experimentado lexicógrafo — participou na elaboração de três dicionários —, traduziu obras de diversos idiomas como latim, francês, espanhol e inglês, e, como prova de sua competência, ofereceu ao leitor lusófono a tradução de autores renomados, tais como Cícero, Sêneca, Santo Agostinho, São Tomás de Aquino, além de literatos como Cervantes, Quevedo e Chesterton. No tocante à *Suma Gramatical*, o estilo literário de Nougué é elegante, erudito e, ao mesmo tempo, agradável.

À primeira vista, dir-se-ia que um livro de gramática seria dispensável em nossos dias, uma vez que tal termo supostamente traz consigo conceitos como regra, ordem, rigidez e até mesmo lembra opressão, para certas pessoas, segundo as quais a Gramática deveria ser por si mesma descartada. No prólogo, entretanto, o Autor critica os que desejam que a língua seja “deixada à deriva, sem regras que a dirijam”. Explica que “isso, no entanto, é pura negação do óbvio: é parte intrínseca de toda e